From Corps Command to Army Command: January–December 1863 (2024)

Brian Holden Reid

As Sherman sailed to the mouth of the Yazoo to meet McClernand on board the River Queen he reflected on his future. Far from succumbing to depression, he was feeling stoic. In truth, his conduct left little to be desired, and he had successfully reembarked “in the face of an enterprising and successful enemy.” Once he could confirm the details of Grant’s setback at Holly Springs, he instantly realized that his own small force could never have been sufficient to hold Vicksburg even if he had succeeded in breaking through and taking it. Despite his skill in managing the operation, he acknowledged that “the taking of Vicksburg by my force was an impossibility.” To his dismay, McClernand had arrived to supersede him, brandishing an order from Lincoln. Time would reveal this document as rather less than it appeared. But for the moment, Sherman consoled himself, “Of course, I submit gracefully,” as the president “has the right to choose his agents,” and he would revert to command of a corps of two divisions; “such is life and luck.” Ellen replied in much more uncompromising language: “The President ought to be impeached for such imbecile acts as placing McC[lernand] in command at the time he did or any time.”1Close

Sherman had not taken much of a backward step, as he had never formally been anything other than a corps commander, though a “wing” of the Army of the Tennessee had been temporarily entrusted to his care. He had gained experience at high command, and he put this to good use. He had already come up with a proposal to dangle before McClernand’s eyes at their first meeting. If Sherman had calculated that his new commander had no real ideas of his own as to how he should carry out the ambitious schemes with which he had tantalized the president, then he proved correct. McClernand talked in generalities but had no detailed plans for a systematic operational program or any preferred tactical method.

The scheme that Sherman came up with suited both their purposes. They both needed a quick, relatively easy success, Sherman to consolidate his standing before doubts could reemerge about his competence, McClernand to advance his reputation with the president and encourage recruitment. As Sherman explained the idea to Ellen, “Instead of lying idle I proposed we should come to the Arkansas and attack the Post of Arkansas 50 miles up that River”; the Confederates had used their bastion at the post, Fort Hindman, to attack federal river communications and interrupt the mails. This operation would gain the dual objectives of, first, securing the Union rear (“We must make the River safe behind us before we push too far down”) and, second, offering McClernand the chance to drive on and seize Little Rock, a state capital, which would add luster to his name.2Close

After voicing some initial doubts, McClernand quickly agreed to Sherman’s proposal and accompanied him to a meeting with Admiral Porter on the night of January 4. Porter had met McClernand the previous year at Lincoln’s suggestion and judged him a self-seeking charlatan. He did not nurse any particular grievances against “political generals”—he would write favorably about Blair and John A. Logan—but he loathed McClernand. Once their deliberations started in earnest, McClernand presented the Arkansas Post proposal as his own and made some tactless remarks about restoring the army’s morale after its demoralizing “late defeat.” If Porter would give him three gunboats, he boasted, “I will go and take the place.” Provoked, Porter shot back that if Sherman was given command, he would sail “with a proper force and will ensure the capture of the ‘Post.’ ” Porter suspected that all McClernand knew about gunboats was that they “had taken Fort Henry.” McClernand “winced” under this assault, and Sherman walked into the aft-cabin, beckoning Porter to follow him; meanwhile, McClernand studied the wall charts in a bid, Porter thought, “to hide his temper.” According to Porter’s account, Sherman chastised him for his sarcastic tone toward McClernand, but the admiral protested, “He shall not treat you rudely in my cabin”; once tempers had cooled on all sides, the discussion resumed, “and the interview ended pleasantly enough.” Sherman handed over command to McClernand “in the most graceful manner,” Porter noted, though he rightly estimated it “a bitter pill” for Sherman to be superseded by a man for whom neither had any respect. Still, Porter agreed to command the naval flotilla himself; thereupon Sherman flattered Porter’s vanity by exclaiming that this would “insure the success of the enterprise.”3Close

On January 4, 1863, with the naval dimension settled, McClernand organized, without the War Department’s permission, the Army of the Mississippi, composed mostly of Sherman’s troops, totaling a little fewer than 29,000 men. He created two corps, the 1st under Brigadier General George W. Morgan and the 2nd under Sherman’s command. Sherman’s two divisions comprised that of Morgan L. Smith’s (currently commanded by David Stuart) and of Frederick Steele, whom he greatly trusted. Sherman did not allow his return to equal status with Morgan to rankle, though he had little respect for his former subordinate. In practice, Sherman’s conduct over the next week could leave little doubt that he was the true commander of the Arkansas Post operation.4Close

The entire force immediately sailed back up the Mississippi River in a convoy of 50 steamboats guarded by Porter’s 13 ironclads, with the transports carrying Sherman and Morgan’s corps in two squadrons, one following the other. On January 9 they rendezvoused at Gavin’s Landing before proceeding up the White River, then turning into the Arkansas River as far as Notrib’s Farm, a short distance below Fort Hindman. McClernand accompanied the force, much to Sherman’s surprise, but he played only a small part in the direction of this operation. Early on the morning of January 10, Sherman issued all the orders, and the troops disembarked unopposed. Sherman later attributed the degree of surprise attained to the continuing prohibition on war correspondents accompanying the convoy. Stuart made contact with Confederates entrenched in a position dug to the Arkansas River designed to shield Fort Hindman from direct assault. McClernand ordered Sherman to take Steele’s division across a “deep, ugly” swamp for about 2 miles in order to outflank it, but after interrogating some local residents and prisoners of war, Sherman realized that such a move would involve a march of 7 miles rather than 2. Probably with a good deal of satisfaction, he sent his chief of staff, Major John Hammond, back to inform McClernand that his plan would not work. In the meantime, McClernand had come forward and saw that Sherman had acted correctly and informed him that every obstacle to a direct attack on Fort Hindman had been cleared, as the breastworks on the river had been abandoned. Sherman then decided to launch a combined assault on the fort.

His plan took a simple form and bore some resemblance to Grant’s assault on Fort Henry the previous year. The Union troops approached Fort Hindman along a peninsula; a road divided it in two, with Morgan on the left adjacent to the Arkansas River and Sherman’s corps on the right of the road, with Stuart’s division in the center and Steele on the right outer flank. At 1:00 a.m. on January 11, Sherman carried out a detailed personal reconnaissance, so close to the Confederate lines “that I could hear the enemy hard at work” strengthening their defenses. “I could almost hear their words, and I was thus listening when, about 4 am the bugler in the rebel camp sounded as pretty a reveille as I had listened to.” When not charmed by the musical accompaniment, Sherman noted that the fort covered about 100 square yards and contained strong armament, with three heavy guns and four smaller 3-inch rifled guns, four 6-pounders, and six other field pieces scattered among the infantry. The fields of fire were clear and marked down so that Sherman could figure precisely its trajectory. Porter had begun a “furious bombardment” on the previous evening, lasting until nightfall, to prepare the way and cover the realignment of the Union forces. He also agreed to launch a simultaneous, combined assault the next morning. As soon as his ironclads opened fire, Sherman and Morgan’s artillery would support them.5Close

At 10:00 a.m. all was ready, though McClernand began to show some impatience. Porter’s gunboats did not open fire until 1:00 p.m., and about 20 minutes later Sherman’s troops launched their assault, supported by covering fire provided by Morgan’s corps. Sherman’s men made good progress, and as Sherman followed the advance with his staff, he noticed that the Confederate artillery were getting their range and shells were landing close by; he ordered the entire party to dismount at once, but he continued to move forward and spotted a white flag unfurling on the parapet. He sent one of his staff, Captain Lewis Dayton, of whom he was particularly fond, up onto the parapet. As the firing stopped, Sherman and the others quickly joined him standing amid piles of Confederate dead. The air filled with “cheers and halloing” as men of Sherman’s two divisions surged into the Confederate works.6Close

The Post of Arkansas had fallen. Its commander, Brigadier General T. J. Churchill, three brigades of infantry (over 4,500 men), and all their stores fell into Union hands; the rebel prisoners, Sherman reported to Ellen, were “clustered on the bank” of the Arkansas River waiting to be transported to Cairo, Illinois. Sherman expressed delight at the “perfect” result. He made a point of stressing the US Navy’s skill (unlike McClernand, who ignored the sailors in his report): “Without them we would have had hard work, with them it was easy.” The total Union casualties numbered 1,032, of which 134 were killed. His success “relieves our Vicksburg trip of all appearance of a reverse as by this move we open the Arkansas and compel all organized masses of the Enemy to pass below the Arkansas River, it will also secure this flank when we renew our attack on it.” Ellen also reported the agreeable news that “people are jubilant over the capture of Post Arkansas and not a paper that I have seen refers this credit to McClernand.”

Grant was less pleased. McClernand had made little effort to apprise him of his intentions, let alone gain his permission for the foray. He did not bother writing to Grant until January 11. Grant’s immediate and fierce response reveals a desire to stamp on what he regarded as a challenge to his authority. He viewed the operation as a distraction and a movement made in the wrong direction and did not seem impressed by Sherman’s mainly tactical arguments. Sherman became perturbed by Grant’s reaction to it as “a wild goose chase.” He wrote him a personal letter on January 17 in an effort to put his mind at rest, underplaying his own role in the affair while emphasizing McClernand’s. Grant did not reply, though its contents were probably discussed at their later private meetings. Sherman made a persuasive case as to the practicability of the operation, given Major General Nathaniel P. Banks’s failure to reduce Port Hudson. But the main reason Sherman wrote this semiofficial missive was to reassure Grant that he had not aligned himself with McClernand in any prospective tussle over command authority. He urged Grant “to come down and see. I only fear McClernand may attempt impossibilities.” Grant had already decided to assume personal command of the operation and had informed McClernand. Sherman knew where his first loyalties lay, but Grant’s cool response to his success did irritate him, and his loyalty would be tested over the next three months, even if it was not found wanting. Despite Sherman’s self-image of the open, plain-speaking man, and his repeatedly expressed indifference to that “gnawing and craving appetite for personal fame” that so seized the likes of McClernand, Sherman could display deviousness when it suited him.7Close

Despite the minor compensating success at Arkansas Post, the great challenge of Vicksburg loomed menacingly over the whole theater of operations. Yet, Sherman contended, Arkansas Post would “have a good Effect on the Main River.” He labored under no illusions: “In the end Vicksburg must be reduced and it is going to be a hard nut to crack.” It was quite simply “the strongest place I ever saw” and would require much labor and even more ingenuity. Eventually, too, Grant would come to agree that the action at Arkansas Post had indeed exerted a beneficial influence on the outcome of the campaign. But at the time he resented not just the distraction and dispersal of force caused by McClernand’s schemes but the strain they placed on the number of river transports and his ability to reinforce his army. In February Grant firmly stamped on another distraction that McClernand promoted: to attack Pine Bluff, Arkansas.8Close

On leaving Arkansas Post, Sherman’s convoy sailed through a severe blizzard, arriving on January 15 at Napoleon, Arkansas, where his troops disembarked. Sherman thought the town resembled “desolation covered with snow,” but his mood lightened when his brother-in-law Hugh, “looking as fine as possible,” unexpectedly appeared to take up command of a brigade in David Stuart’s division. Sherman worried over the absence of letters from Ellen, a very conscientious correspondent, and Hugh’s arrival prompted him to sit down and write to her. He urged her not to move to Cincinnati, which she had been contemplating, as he disliked the secessionist tone to be found in that city. The following day a fire broke out in Napoleon. Sherman’s energetic reaction limited the damage to just one block; he suspected arson but could not find the culprit.9Close

Sherman predicted correctly that Grant would soon arrive “to command in person—McClernand is unfit” and too preoccupied with his own advancement. This required little prescience on his part, as he had urged this very course on his commander. In a War Department instruction, General Orders No. 210 of December 18, 1862, issued while Sherman was making his way to the Yazoo, the troops in the Departments of the Tennessee and Missouri, including Samuel Curtis’s troops under Sherman’s command, were organized into four army corps, the 13th under McClernand, the 15th under Sherman, the 16th under Stephen A. Hurlbut, and the 17th under James B. McPherson. Grant had been informed by Halleck that it was “the President’s wish” that “McClernand’s corps shall constitute a part of the river expedition and that he shall have the immediate command under your direction.” After McClernand’s return from Arkansas Post, Grant decided to exercise this direction very tightly and assume personal command. The creation of the other two corps greatly reduced McClernand’s role, despite his seniority, and rendered him less influential than Sherman. A month later, on January 18, Grant arrived at Napoleon and ordered his subordinates to take their commands immediately south to the west bank of the Mississippi opposite Vicksburg at Young’s Point. In private Sherman continued to grapple with the operational problem that would be Grant’s primary responsibility, namely, “how a large force should somehow reach the ridge between the Black and Yazoo, so as [to] approach from the Rear.”10Close

Even before Grant’s arrival Sherman began to reveal more candid opinions about McClernand. Initially Sherman had consoled himself that “I certainly envy no one the anxiety of providing for so many people,” meaning the five divisions under his command. On further reflection after Arkansas Post, Sherman began to consider McClernand a danger to the Union cause because of his overambitious, unsustainable plans. “I never dreamed of so severe a test of my patriotism as being superseded by McClernand,” he protested to John, “and if I can keep down my true spirit & live I will claim a virtue higher than Brutus.” Despite these seething tensions, Sherman and McClernand contrived to work together amicably and positively, to the credit of both. Sherman also drew an enduring lesson from the vicissitudes of the last two months. After completing an essay exploring the dangers of meddling in military affairs, written for his own satisfaction, he concluded that disappointments were mainly the product of “the condition of things. Human power is limited and you cannot appreciate the difficulty of molding into a hom*ogeneous machine the discordant elements which go to make up our armies.” This insight determined his fundamental operational caution in high command in 1864–65. He would be guided by the imperative never to endanger the cohesion, safety, and offensive efficiency of the force entrusted to his command.11Close

The more Sherman reflected on his relations with McClernand, the more his pose of diffidence revealed itself as a mask that slipped all too readily. On January 24 Sherman reported to Ellen that McClernand “is now sick in bed” after sending his “Chief of Cavalry,” Colonel Warren Stewart, on an ill-conceived raid the previous day that ended in Stewart’s death. Then, referring to himself in the third person, he averred, “I know one fact very well, that when danger is present, or important steps are necessary Sherman is invariably called for”; whatever it was, he attended conscientiously to numerous unglamorous chores—“unloading steamboats and repairing roads.” He also reflected on his previous command experience “that when danger is present I feel it less than when it is in the remote future or in the past.” Sherman evinced in these weeks a strong confidence in his own abilities, but this sense of satisfaction was marred by frustration and renewed gloom over his prospects.12Close

After Grant’s arrival, though McClernand might still attempt to issue “provoking, short, curt orders,” he no longer commanded Sherman—except during Grant’s brief absences. On January 20 Grant stated in no uncertain terms to Halleck the universal distrust that McClernand provoked. “This is a matter I made no inquiries about but it was forced upon me.” Grant later revealed that if Sherman “had been left in command,” his confidence in him was such that he might have entrusted the campaign to him. Sherman, it must be said, did not reveal a comparable level of confidence in the decisions that Grant had taken since assuming command, glad though Sherman was to see him.13Close

After the Napoleon meeting Grant “hurried us back to Vicksburg on the theory that Banks might be here disappointed at our non-appearance—So here we are again but not a word of Banks.” Sherman’s views remained consistent over the next three months. The paramount need remained to reach dry land, “to get ashore where we can fight.” The original plan developed in December 1862 he believed offered the best chance to locate terra firma. Grant should advance on Vicksburg from the northeast, Nathaniel P. Banks from the south, with Sherman operating again on the Yazoo, “but cooperation at such distances,” he acknowledged with more experience than most, “and over such long lines is almost an impossibility.” Nevertheless, Sherman remained dedicated to this conception, as its overall thrust resembled the form of his mature plans. It provided, he held, “the best and only” plan, because once Yazoo City had been occupied the advance could follow “Black River Bridge to the rear of Vicksburg.” The fortress could then be sealed off by “a smaller force all afloat to act in front [as] the guns of the main attack be heard.”14Close

Grant’s General Orders No. 14 specified that the 15th Corps comprised two divisions. These were of three brigades each after Hugh Ewing’s arrival, amounting to 15,909 men. The troops were encamped on a neck of low ground at Young’s Plantation that ran into a levee immediately in front of Vicksburg. The town was “in full view,” he informed Ellen, “and we are within range of their Rifle Guns, but thus far both [sides] are sparing of powder as the deep Mississippi intervenes, and neither can reach the other.” The unpredictable waters of the Mississippi proved far more troublesome. As he recalled later, they “continued to rise and threatened to drown us.” The only refuge to be found lay on the levee or on board the steamboats. Sherman reconnoiterd the area between Young’s Point and Vicksburg systematically and pushed forward Stuart’s division without wagons, repairing the railroad and its bridges as it marched; thereafter he ordered the preparation of a map. Frederick Steele’s division then followed. Sherman instituted a system whereby each division provided alternate details of 500 men per day to dig the half-completed canal begun the previous year. Grant hoped this would turn the Mississippi on the Confederate right and allow Porter’s fleet of gunboats to escort the river transports across the peninsula in front of Vicksburg and thus permit Sherman’s troops to disembark on dry land.

Stuart’s men began the irksome task of “widening the canal nine feet and throwing to the earth on the other side of the canal so, if it fills, it will overflow the other side first.” The level of water in the canal rose a mere 2 feet. Grant meanwhile traveled to Memphis to supervise McPherson’s operations at Lake Providence before hurriedly returning on January 28. Sherman thus reported to McClernand at Milliken’s Bend, “The road across the swamp is now very bad, and I have ordered four of Steele’s regiments to corduroy the whole distance, say two miles. I have never seen men work more grudgingly, and I have endeavoured to stimulate them by all means.” Sherman busied himself drawing up rotas to ensure that his soldiers did not labor for too long, visiting camps and making sure that the men were well fed and safely sheltered. The men appreciated his efforts, and morale improved. They could not fail to notice that their commander’s headquarters at Mrs. Grove’s house was completely surrounded by water “and could only be reached by a plank-walk from the levee built on posts.”15Close

Anxiety over the state of morale persuaded Sherman to continue a policy that had been aimed previously at reporters, namely, requiring the captains of steamboats to sign bonds stipulating that they would not carry persons unless “contracted for”; otherwise deserters would make their escape by river, and “the men will stick to the boats.” Sherman also remained alert lest squadrons of Confederate transports be sailed down to Vicksburg to disturb his preparations. “No enemy,” he reported, “can come through that swamp with artillery or in order, and could only act in small numbers or detached parties.” He placed four 6-pounder guns below Vicksburg to prevent Confederate vessels from reaching its docks; the supply line via the Red River had been disrupted, but Sherman still fretted that due to Banks’s failure to take Port Hudson, Confederates still controlled the mouth of the Red River and a long stretch of the Mississippi. Other worries included keeping Admiral Porter supplied with coal. The “foul” weather and “awful” roads rendered supply by road “a simple impossibility.” His own predicament worsened when the canal suddenly began to rise and threatened his camps. He still remained positive and intent on doing all he could for the navy, and he assured Porter that coal-bearing “barges could work through the canal.” Sherman was right. Those with tricky problems, especially if they involved logistics, invariably turned to him for advice or to sort the matter out for them.16Close

At the end of January Sherman embroiled himself in another frustrating affair entirely of his own making. He provoked another spat with newspaper reporters.

Its root lay in Sherman’s extreme sensitivity to any hostile investigation of his conduct of the first Vicksburg campaign. He protested to Ethan Allen Hitchco*ck that “it is absurd to hold me responsible for not taking Vicksburg alone but a few weeks and months will show that double and treble any force are requisite and then not sure of success.” The passage of time perhaps vindicates his argument, but as the campaign stumbled from one failed expedient to another, Sherman grew alarmed lest he become associated with continual blundering. Porter shrewdly observed that Sherman was “very sensitive and allowed things to worry him unnecessarily.”17Close

“The newspapers are after me again,” Sherman warned Ellen. She had already advised him wisely, “You might as well attempt to control the whirlwind as the newspaper mania so I advise you to attempt no longer to set your face against the Storm.” Sherman would not listen, and she pleaded, “You cannot do anything unaided against them and there is not one man in power who will unite with you against them. So dear Cump give up the Struggle and Suffer them to annoy you no longer.” He took no notice and asked the admiral to send him “a few lines” of approbation on the quality of his preparation, planning, and conduct of the operation, and generally “whether I acted the part of an intelligent officer or that of an insane fool.” Sherman evidently feared a resurgence of that hateful slur.18Close

Sherman’s earlier antipress measures had given journalists a pretext to attack him. In December 1862 he had issued General Orders No. 8 prohibiting reporters from accompanying his expedition. Some, including Thomas W. Knox of the New York Herald, succeeded in evading it, but even these intrepid souls found it difficult to make sense of what they witnessed from afar. They quickly shifted onto the attack and lambasted Sherman for a recklessness that had resulted in “another” Fredericksburg. There were numerous snide references to his “insane” disposition. Reporters could suggest quite plausibly that the denial of information by Sherman and his staff reflected deliberate conniving on their part in a complete concealment of “the truth”; the press were heroically doing their job by exposing a “cover-up.” Sherman had the most to lose if he could be exposed as the chief culprit. His friend Porter commented on the “sort of freemasonry” among reporters “that makes them hang together like vampire bats” so that if Sherman offended one, he risked offending them all.19Close

These attacks were nasty, although in line with standard journalistic techniques well established by the mid-nineteenth century, especially the “pack mentality” in following with frenzied enthusiasm a story to see how it might evolve. Sherman was especially annoyed by the sarcastic tone of Knox of the New York Herald, who attributed Sherman’s mismanagement to spending too much time thwarting the press. Certainly, Sherman’s belligerent attitude had spread to his staff. Major Hammond had threatened to shoot Franc B. Wilkie, the New York Times correspondent. Ellen deplored her husband’s wild talk of “hanging” reporters and urged him to remember that some newspapers were “only too anxious to stand by you.”20Close

Sherman offered his brother a reasoned though characteristically sweeping and fiery critique of the baleful influence of an unregulated press in wartime. He argued that stress on the liberty of the press in wartime was symptomatic of a society that offered too much respect to individual liberty in a great war that threatened the existence of the whole political community. Uncensored newspapers revealed to the Confederates an abundance of information about Union strength, organizations, and intentions. They retarded the Union war effort, cost precious lives, and sapped confidence. The press, moreover, provided a conduit by which constant meddling in the Union war effort could be pursued; the newspapers encouraged “that growing and craven appetite for personal fame and notoriety which has brought our people into a just contempt with foreign nations.” The lack of discipline at all levels confirmed, in Sherman’s opinion, Confederate military superiority. Finally, Sherman was irked by the personal abuse, “when a malicious individual hanging about as a spy can accuse me before the world and be believed rather than me.”21Close

Sherman intended to turn the tables on journalists and demand of them legal accountability. As he confided to Ellen, “I am now determined to test the question. Do they [reporters] rule or the Comm[an]d[ing] Gen[eral]? If they rule I quit. … I will never command again an army in America if we must carry along paid spies.” On January 27 Sherman ordered Thomas Knox’s arrest and stated his intention to court-martial him and, he hoped, to “execute him as a spy.” This last reference denotes a measure of vindictiveness, indeed obsession, on Sherman’s part, but he had raised significant issues concerning the relationship of the military and the press in wartime, matters involving “a high moral and political principle.” His pursuit of this principle transcends the issue of his own haunted, frenetic, and sometimes unwise conduct.22Close

Knox quickly learned of Sherman’s intention and attempted to calm him with apologies, flattery, and an offer to correct the original article, after admitting its errors. On January 31 Knox was arrested and hauled before Sherman. No longer contrite, he told Sherman that he had “no feeling against you personally,” which was probably true, but then boasted that as all reporters agreed Sherman was no friend of theirs, they should “in self-defense write you down.” He then revealed a potentially explosive detail: Frank Blair had supplied the majority of his most damaging criticisms. To Sherman’s jaundiced eye, Knox appeared “a strong, stalwart” young man “capable of holding a musket” who had chosen not to do so. His combination of servility and effrontery revolted Sherman and convinced him of the wisdom of his chosen course.23Close

Sherman intended to charge Knox at once, but first he had to satisfy himself that Blair had played no part in the imbroglio. Blair had already denied leaking information to the press, but the aftermath of Chickasaw Bluffs had spawned a good deal of poisonous gossip among the Blair family that traduced Sherman’s moral character.24Close Blair sent Sherman a kind letter admiring his assumption of all responsibility for Chickasaw Bluffs, though he believed it “unjust to yourself or friends” that “the blunders committed by inferior officers … should be laid to your charge or assumed by you.” But this letter might be considered self-serving considering the controversy that had already threatened to engulf him. In a letter to his brother at the end of January, Sherman indicated a tendency to believe Knox’s revelation, as he described the latter as a “correspondent Blair carries along for self-glorification.” On February 2 he sent Blair a stern written interrogatory containing 22 precisely worded questions directed toward elucidating not only Blair’s knowledge of the first Vicksburg campaign but also minor points of logistical detail concerning the evacuation. They included particular questions about Sherman’s command technique. “Do you not know that I personally remained in our camp at the bayou till every particle of ordnance, wagons, &c., and all the troops but the rear guard had reached the river?”

Blair replied by return in a state of “mortification,” denying that he had ever made a “statement” that Knox could have construed as critical. His reply, as expected, is suffused with praise for his superior, though he did concede that he thought it “unfortunate” that any major assault had been made without the aid of Porter’s naval guns; that is, the assault should have been made at Haines Bluff rather than at Chickasaw, but this view fell rather short of advocating this scheme as an alternative. Blair was critical of George Morgan’s slovenly methods that did not allow Blair sufficient time to carry out any kind of reconnaissance. Finally, Blair urged Sherman to consult Steele as to whether “I have not invariably expressed myself in the kindest manner toward you.” Blair’s was a fine legal statement that still left open the possibility that he had made sarcastic comments to Knox in private that the latter had either misconstrued or exaggerated.25Close

The emphatic but friendly tone displayed in Blair’s statement and personal letter about Chickasaw Bluffs pleased Sherman and cleared the air. So Sherman followed up his earlier missive with a rather more affable letter, elaborating on his calculations at Chickasaw Bluffs. Sherman revealed that Morgan, contrary to his later justifications, “was full of confidence” in carrying out his assigned task, but Sherman reiterated his continuing lack of interest in identifying scapegoats among “any generous and brave set of men.” Sherman concluded the exchange with a gracious flourish: “If at one time I did think you had incautiously dropped expressions which gave a newspaper spy the grounds of accusations against all save those in your brigade and division, I now retract that and assure you of my confidence and respect.” Henceforth, though Sherman neither liked nor admired Blair, he closed the issue of his possible disloyalty, and the two men established a solid working relationship that would improve and last for the rest of the war.26Close

On February 5 Knox’s court-martial convened at Young’s Point, and Knox was summoned to appear two days later. He faced three charges: “Giving intelligence to the enemy, directly or indirectly”; “Being a spy”; and “Disobedience of orders.” All were broad and rather vaguely framed. Knox managed to persuade Brigadier General John M. Thayer, the president of the court, a brigade commander in Steele’s 1st Division and lawyer by profession, to drop a specification in the second charge that his false statements aided the enemy. Sherman offered testimony on February 10–11, but when he claimed that material from Knox’s articles appeared in Southern newspapers, Knox’s defense counsel retorted that this was irrelevant supposition. The latter also scored a success by eliciting an admission that Grant, not Sherman, commanded the overall force at Chickasaw and that Knox carried a pass signed by Grant. Concluding statements were delivered on February 14. Four days later the court issued its verdict: Knox was found not guilty of the first two charges, guilty of the third charge; the court found that he had disobeyed Sherman’s orders “but attribute[d] no criminality thereto.” Knox was ordered out of army lines. A mighty explosion occurred inside Mrs. Grove’s house when the 15th Corps commander received news of the verdict. Both Ellen and her father worried that Sherman might insist on resigning, but his fury passed, and he did not do so. For one thing, Ellen warned him that his old enemy Benjamin Stanton, the lieutenant governor of Ohio, had threatened to revive the “charges of insanity,” and “nothing would please him better than your resignation at a time when you are pressed and worried.” At last he heeded Ellen’s sensible advice.27Close

Sherman had failed to gain the legal precedent he wanted, namely, “that a nation and army must defend its safety and existence by making all acts militating against it criminal regardless of the mere interest of the instrument.” Eventually such safeguards and priority would be achieved, but not in the Civil War. Throughout the trial the newspapers had offered little criticism of Sherman’s action; indeed, some, like Sherman’s nemesis, the Cincinnati Commercial, were sympathetic. Dissatisfied with the outcome of the court-martial, Sherman petitioned Grant’s headquarters demanding that the judgment be reviewed by higher authority, but Grant and Rawlins, his chief of staff, were content to let the matter drop. Two months later, when Knox tried to return, Sherman gained the point tacitly, supported by Lincoln and more forcefully by Grant, that reporters could not accompany military formations unless they enjoyed the support of the designated commander. A willingness to follow orders, Sherman maintained, was “vital” against an enemy with “advantages of … position and means of intelligence.” Sherman thus seized authority over reporters, and he would use it sensibly and in the best interests of the forces he commanded. He had gained a further advantage: Knox’s court-martial had frightened all reporters, and they would henceforth treat him warily.28Close

Sherman’s aggressive manner has provoked overblown arguments that suggest his attitudes toward the press reveal a penchant for dictatorship. Sherman expressed skepticism about the value of democratic institutions; he never embraced any ideology that sought their overthrow. His views at this time were directed exclusively toward waging the war effort more efficiently. He took the presumption and irresponsibility displayed by the press as a symptom of the prevailing “spirit of anarchy” that he found “more alarming than the batteries that shell us from the opposite shore.” The latter sentiment is typical of Sherman’s exaggerations and exposed rhetoric. Still, he was right in condemning the search for scapegoats that the press encouraged. In a brilliant metaphor, he likened popular opinion to a “drunkard whose natural tastes have become so vitiated that nought but brandy will satisfy them.” He argued that the press should be held accountable for its conduct. To a large extent he succeeded: for the rest of the war, reporters covering his operations were tamed, and their stories did not endanger Sherman’s progress.29Close

The Knox court-martial occurred in February and March. With the arrival of spring, thoughts had to be focused exclusively on the reduction of Vicksburg. “In all controversies,” Sherman mused, “there is a time when discussion must cease and action begin,” for the Vicksburg campaign could wait for no legal pronouncements. The slothful course so far merely accentuated Sherman’s sense of gloom over its dismal prospects. He never made a secret of his lack of faith in the canal scheme; it would fail to “draw in a volume and depth of water sufficient”; even if it did work, he believed, the Confederates would simply withdraw their guns to Warrenton on the Mississippi River, which lay below the mouth of the canal. At one point he confessed to John very pessimistic sentiments: “It is expecting too much of us to capture the place”—but this outburst merely illustrates his tendency to use correspondence as a means of discharging frustration. A further setback occurred when the new ram Queen of the West, sent by Porter at Grant’s urging, attacked Vicksburg’s wharves and river commerce and damaged the CSS Vicksburg but then ran aground in the Red River, fell into Confederate hands, and was quickly turned against its former owners. The incident confirmed Sherman’s worst fears: it offered “ominous” evidence that the Confederates controlled “the river below free and unobstructed,” and he gloomily expected the enemy at any time to make his “appearance in boats from that direction.” Outposts were equipped with signal rockets to warn Sherman in the event of a Confederate naval foray.30Close

In the early days of February 1863 Grant confided in Sherman, proposing a new plan. It required entrance to the Yazoo and would attempt to turn the Confederate right flank above Haines Bluff again so that the gunboats could reach Yazoo City, “turn the main river into Lake Providence,” and thence allow access to the Tensas River, and then the Black, Red, and Atchafalaya Rivers, “without approaching any bluffs or ground easy of defense.” As the plan was based on the 1862 concept, Sherman hailed it enthusiastically as “admirable.” “Cover up the design all you can,” he advised Grant, “and it will fulfill all the conditions of the great problem. This little affair of ours here on Vicksburg Point is labor lost.” Feeling the warmth of a little optimism, he wrote to his old friend Edward O. C. Ord, currently recuperating from wounds, suggesting he report to Grant as an alternative to McClernand. Ellen had grown to dislike Ord because of his regard for McClellan, but he remained one of Sherman’s closest friends. But confirmation of the loss of the Queen of the West slowed down the pace of operations. Attempts were made to build two further canals, one at Yazoo Pass and the other at Lake Providence; the latter “is the only one in which I feel an interest.” Sherman felt such renewed despair, especially late at night, that he urged Ellen to find “some quiet place” to take the children “and prepare them at least for the better future that must be.” Although she had recently recovered from illness, he warned her to “brace yourself” for the possible loss of his reputation. In these moods Ellen tried to cheer him up with news of his children: “It would do your heart good to watch them at their plays.”31Close

The multitude of setbacks forced Sherman to rethink the nature of the war he was fighting. “The further we penetrate, the further we remove from home the less we are esteemed or encouraged.” The occupation of increasing swathes of the Confederacy raised fundamental problems not just of procedure but in the style of fighting that the Union employed. “We get all the Knocks and rarely see one grain of Encouragement from ‘home,’ ” he complained. He had in mind one recent letter from the secretary of war notifying him that he had received complaints from a Mrs. Jane Seymour about one of Sherman’s best regiments, the 8th Missouri, which she claimed had despoiled her property in Memphis. “They are no worse than other volunteers,” Sherman observed, “all of whom come to us filled with the popular idea that they must clean out the Secesh, must waste and not protect their property, must burn, waste and destroy.” Sherman still regarded this as a “foul doctrine.” Yet the paradox in Sherman’s views at this date lay in his statement of what the North needed to do to achieve final victory.32Close

Sherman stressed a need for a coherent sense of purpose. “The Army growls a good deal,” he informed John, “at the apathy of the nation, at home quiet, comfortable, and happy yet pushing them forward on all sorts of desperate expeditions.” The Confederacy respected the Union more than it had two years previously, but it still remained irreconcilable. Hence the resort to punitive methods, as “our armies are devastating the land”; it might be “sad,” but “we cannot help it” so long as the rebels remained defiant. Sherman still could not glimpse the beginning of the end of the appeal of this “ardent” cause, let alone victory. “Now you must see,” he admonished John, “that to subdue the Rebellion you must obliterate a whole Race, our equals in courage, resources and determination.” The North still had to take the war really seriously, which meant setting aside its preoccupation with individual rights and constitutional niceties. The central priority should be to organize itself to fight a great war efficiently. If the government failed to do this, the North would “continue groping in the dark … [and] as a people we must pay the price.” The recent conscription act Sherman thought “the first sensible move I have yet seen.” He sent a well-rehearsed case to Ohio governor David Tod pleading that new troops be sent to sustain existing regiments rather than used to create new, inexperienced formations that would be forced to start from scratch. “Since the first hostile shot,” he recapitulated a favorite theme, “the people of the North must conquer, or be conquered.” The Union must therefore harness its military strength—“we must outnumber them, if we want to succeed”—but, he cautioned, the task would not get any easier. “We are forced to invade—we must keep the War South till they are not only ruined, exhausted, but humbled in pride and spirit.” The latter was an especially important point. But Sherman queried whether Union armies were “equal to the occasion.” His answer was no, for “our lines of communication are threatened by their dashes, for which the country, the population and character of the enemy are all perfectly adapted.” Sherman could see what needed to be done, but amid the Vicksburg despondence he could not yet see how it could be done.33Close

A temporary gap thus emerges in Sherman’s thinking. He was prepared to accept the need for punitive measures, especially against Southern guerrillas, so long as they were controlled by legitimate military authority rather than released in a vengeful, spontaneous, undisciplined outburst by the men in the ranks; such outbreaks should be discouraged at all costs. For example, he instructed Fred Steele to ensure that “all the people understand that we claim the unmolested navigation of the Mississippi River and will have it, if all the country within reach had to be laid waste”; such threats, however, should remain constrained, for Southerners should “be spared the ravages of war as much as we can consistent with our own interests.” But for the time being, Sherman conceived such threats as responses to very specific tactical questions, not as reflecting a general outlook on the war as a whole.34Close

Sherman complained of the “vacillating Policy of our Government and People”; he again threatened to resign if Lincoln exhibited any “want of confidence” in Grant, though he wished Halleck would return to take up command of the West for a second time. He began to wonder whether Grant would ever find a way out of the quagmire, and he admitted that he was “sorry that I ever embarked in a voyage so sure to be disastrous to the first actors.” Ominously he reported to Ellen on March 13 that the water continued to rise. He took his mind off his worries by penning a delightful letter to his daughter Minnie. He reflected on the art of written style, as “now is the time to learn to write plain and well and habit will make it Easy.” He also revealed that he had received many kindnesses in recent weeks from the Sisters of Charity on board a hospital ship with Porter’s fleet. One had sent him a can of preserves, but he did not reveal whether he had shared this with the admiral. Sherman concluded by assuring Minnie that she was fortunate in being born to such a good family “and will not want for friends in this world.”35Close

On March 16 Grant confided to Sherman that he wanted to more fully explore the Yazoo route via Haines Bluff. He ordered Sherman to carry out a reconnaissance in force, “and I shall go up in a tug tomorrow morning”; Sherman expressed delight at the prospect. Grant issued his orders the same day: Sherman should take the Pioneer Corps and the 8th Missouri, as “many of them [were] boatmen.” Sherman ordered their commanding officer to take 300 axes and a keg of spikes with which they could make rafts to aid the men who hacked away at the top of the overhanging tree canopy. His orders specified that he should gauge “the feasibility of getting an Army through that route to the East bank of that river and at a point from which they can act advantageously against Vicksburg.” Sherman probed forward via Steele’s Bayou and Black Bayou, then accompanied Admiral Porter as he sailed into Deer Creek. As this seemed wide with few obstructions, Porter indulged a sanguine mood. He asked Sherman to return and “clear out” Black Bayou while he sailed on. Porter lent Sherman a tug, the Fern, and he duly did so. Black Bayou, he reported, was “about a mile long, narrow, crooked, and filled with trees.” He failed to find a suitable route. Provisions were “abundant” but the communications lamentable: “You know,” he cautioned Grant, “the difficulty of managing detached boats in small, crooked streams, where overhanging boughs and submerged trees obstruct their progress at every quarter of a mile.” Sherman also warned Grant that the Confederates could sail their boats to the Rolling Fork Bayou far more quickly than Porter, as they enjoyed the benefit of a more direct route of a mere 7 miles. Porter estimated that he needed 10,000 men to hold the country through which he passed and clear all obstructions. Sherman presented a gloomy report but left it up to Grant to order a continuance of the mission.36Close

At midnight on March 19–20 the dramatic pace of the operation suddenly quickened. While writing dispatches and issuing orders, Sherman received an urgent appeal for help from Porter written on a piece of tissue paper and hidden by a slave in a piece of tobacco. The admiral’s progress up Deer Creek had been more tortuous than anticipated, but his withdrawal was endangered by Confederate infantry, which had worked around behind him and felled trees, blocking his escape route. Their musket fire killed sailors who attempted to steer the gunboats away from the bank or to remove obstacles. Porter feared the worst and pleaded with Sherman to rescue him. Otherwise he might be forced to abandon his vessels and blow them up, which would constitute a disaster for Grant’s campaign. As ever in an emergency, Sherman was energy incarnate: he paddled a canoe down Black Bayou, ordered forward elements of Giles Smith’s brigade, and then rounded up men from various work details, as well as troops of Kilby Smith’s brigade who had just arrived. He got them aboard ship and sailed as far as they could on a dark night, then disembarked and marched through the canebreak “carrying lighted candles in our hands, till we got into the open cotton fields at Hill’s Plantation, where we lay down for a few hours’ rest.” At daybreak on March 21 Sherman ordered them on. “Being on foot myself, no one could complain, and we generally went at the double-quick, with occasional rests.” By noon they had marched 21 miles.

After Sherman sat down for a well-earned rest, he received word from a picket that a rebel force with 6-pounder guns had got between the fleet and relief, but no larger force lay between Sherman and the gunboats. Spurred to action by the sound of musketry, “not three hundred yards off,” he ordered an advance of two battalions of Kilby Smith’s brigade, mounted a horse lent by an officer of the 8th Missouri, and then rode bareback and melodramatically along the levee to be greeted by a great cheer from Porter’s sailors as Union troops drove off the Confederates. Sherman deployed his men to screen Porter’s withdrawal as he sailed hard astern back down Deer Creek, a “slow and tedious process,” Sherman recalled. It still took three days to extricate the five gunboats from the waterway and return them to Hill’s Plantation. Not surprisingly after this experience, Sherman concluded that Rolling Fork Bayou was impassable and Deer Creek “useless to us in a military way.” Grant had by this time received Sherman’s pessimistic reports and ordered both Sherman and Porter to return to their camp at Young’s Point. Sherman had repaired there by March 27. Grant expressed bitter disappointment at this setback. He candidly admitted to Sherman “that I had made really but little calculation u[p]on reaching Vicksburg by any other [route] than Hain[e]s Bluff.” But the disaster could have been of a greater magnitude, as Porter had contemplated scuttling his ships when escape seemed impossible. By his extraordinary display of personal leadership and energetic action, Sherman had saved the campaign. But to what end?37Close

After the excitement and challenges posed during the previous week, the return to Young’s Point cast an anticlimactic and depressing pall over the proceedings. Sherman warned John not to jump to the conclusion that the South was teetering on the verge of exhaustion. “I get deserters and other information daily and I see not one symptom of relaxation, on the contrary quite the reverse. The war in Earnest has yet to be fought.” A series of brilliant insights then followed on the Civil War’s general character. “People must learn that war is a question of physical force and courage,” he reminded John. As the assailant, the North had no choice but “to overcome not only an equal number of determined men, however wrongfully engaged, but the natural obstacles of a most difficult country.” It had to wear down the South and “should fight on all occasions even if we get worsted—we can stand it longest—We are killing Arkansas and Louisiana—All the lands are overflown and they cannot cultivate.” But Sherman discerned that Northern numerical superiority had to some extent been negated by the chaotic system of raising troops. Military strength must be conserved even amid societies with a plentiful supply of men; resources are never limitless. These audacious insights into the war’s character increasingly bolstered the cautious conclusions that Sherman drew about the operational design that urgently needed to be fashioned for the Vicksburg campaign. This paradoxical combination of audacity and caution would grow stronger as Sherman’s command style matured.38Close

Grant had reacted to the Yazoo disappointment with characteristic tenacity. He issued orders for work to begin on digging another canal to link the Mississippi River at Duckport with Willow Bayou, which abutted Milliken’s Bend; he hoped it would create a route through which troops and supplies could be transported to New Carthage and thence to the river port of Grand Gulf. The canal would improve the chances of making a successful junction with Banks to the south; 3,000 men toiled on this project. “Though it is a plan,” Sherman observed disapprovingly, “it is not a good plan.” Sherman persisted in the belief that the campaign’s decisive point lay in the north and east, not the south, and to go southward was to “commit a great mistake, but I am not going to advise one way or the other.” He remained loyal to Grant and dutifully carried out his orders irrespective of his personal views. He confided doubts only to his father-in-law and Ellen, issuing stern instructions that the former should not write to the War Department mentioning them in case his doubts should leak out. Yet he remained less than impressed by Grant’s capacity as a planner. He made indirectly worded allusions to Ellen about Grant’s “slow but sure” propensities; she could not mistake his meaning. Many others shared these doubts. Secretary of War Stanton had heard alarming gossip about Grant’s alcohol consumption. He sent Charles A. Dana, a former newspaperman who had been appointed assistant secretary of war in March 1863, to check on progress and assess Grant’s capacity to meet the challenges that lay ahead. Dana soon came to admire Grant, and Sherman reported that Rawlins told him Dana “was better pleased with me than he could have possibly expected.”39Close

In the first week of April, Grant held a series of informal discussions concerning the campaign’s future. Once these had concluded and he had thought matters over, he issued his new plan. His concept of operations shifted the entire weight of the offensive even farther southward. He required Porter’s naval squadron and transports to sail past Vicksburg, and once this had been achieved, the three corps of the Army of the Tennessee were to march southward on the left bank of the Mississippi and then cross to the right bank. It was a quite extraordinarily audacious conception because Grant defied conventional wisdom that held it a blunder to leave an inviolate fortress astride his supply lines, with an unbeaten army between him and shelter. In reaching this decision, Grant had deliberately encouraged what the historian Sir John Keegan dubs “a sort of barbershop meeting” atmosphere. All his subordinates, Sherman recalled, “talked over all these things with absolute freedom.” Sherman and others did not hesitate to voice their opposition, but the discussion took place against the background of McClernand’s disloyalty to Grant. McClernand did not hesitate to denounce his superior’s supposed incompetence behind his back or to send Lincoln an account of a drunken spree the previous March. Sherman feared that McClernand had made headway in his scheming to supplant Grant. On April 8 Sherman sent Rawlins, Grant’s chief of staff, a letter suggesting that all corps commanders present their commander with “their opinions, concise and positive, on the best general plan of campaign.” He then outlined his preferred alternative. He later claimed that the real point of the letter lay in the possibility that in the event of another failure, ambitious subordinates—he meant McClernand—would claim that their advice had been ignored, but if it had been followed defeat would have been avoided. His proposal would ensure that McClernand’s views, or lack of them, would be on the record.40Close

Sherman promised his “zealous cooperation and energetic support” whatever course of action Grant selected. In his Memoirs Sherman is sensitive to any accusation that this letter constituted some kind of “protest” against Grant’s new plan. He insists that he sought to smoke McClernand out and force him to put his ideas on paper so that he could be held to account. Such a move would also demonstrate the poverty of McClernand’s military ideas. Perhaps, but Sherman privately exhibited little real confidence that Grant’s plan would succeed. The letter had the secondary objective of ensuring that should Grant fail, Sherman’s objections, too, were a matter of record.41Close

The turbulent atmosphere in Mississippi was further unsettled when news reached Sherman that “war between Ellen and Elizabeth,” his sister, had broken out again over the Sherman house in Lancaster. Ellen worried, he confided to John, “lest Elizabeth attempt to come between me and her,” but this could never happen. Another piece of irritating news arrived informing Sherman that David Stuart had failed to gain Senate confirmation as a brigadier general. He quizzed John as to why. “He was one of the best of the whole lot … constantly at the Front. … His military record was perfect.” Sherman put Stuart’s failure down to “some old affair in Chicago”; he had committed adultery, though he eventually married the lady in question. Sherman appears justified in thinking it extraordinary that Stuart was chastised with adultery when two generals, Daniel E. Sickles and Philip Kearny, had committed the same act and escaped congressional wrath. Ellen informed him that her father’s inquiries had revealed that Senator Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania had agreed that the “pharasiacal” members had indeed voted against him on these grounds. “Did you ever hear of a greater absurdity?” she asked. Stuart resigned his commission as colonel, and his departure caused a reorganization of the 15th Corps. On April 3 a division commanded by Brigadier General James M. Tuttle was allotted to Sherman, although it received the official designation of the 1st Division. The following day Stuart was replaced by Brigadier General Frank Blair of the 2nd Division. Sherman was less than enchanted by this appointment. “I am afraid of that class of men,” he admitted to John; “they are so treacherous.” It would appear that Sherman had not taken Blair’s protestations of innocence at face value when he accused him of spiteful gossiping to Knox of the New York Herald. “Pray do not offend him Cump,” Ellen implored sagely, for Blair was a brave and doughty fighter.42Close

“The trees are in full leaf—the black and blue birds sing sweetly,” Sherman rhapsodized to Ellen, “and the mockingbird is frantic with Joy—the Rose and the violet, the beds of verbena and Mignonette, planted by fair hands now in exile from their homes occupied by the Rude Barbarian”—but this pastoral repose would soon be disrupted by equally frantic military activity. On April 20 Grant had made his preparations and had certainly made up his mind, and so issued his orders: he would move south. McClernand’s 13th Corps would form the right flank and vanguard, McPherson’s 17th Corps the center, and Sherman would follow McClernand: his 15th Corps would compose the left flank and would come up last, “the movement being by the right flank.” “I don’t object to this,” he confessed to Ellen, “for I have no faith in the whole plan.” Porter’s seven ironclads and three transports cast off after dark on April 16; his flag flew on the Benton, but even Porter’s ebullience could not disguise the rising tension. He had to escort the transports past Vicksburg’s guns, with each transport towing 10 barges. They were an inviting target.

As a precaution Sherman had ordered that four yawl boats be hauled across the swamps below Vicksburg to enable his men to intercept any disabled vessels and rescue their stricken crews. As soon as Porter’s ships were spotted, Confederate artillery opened fire in what Sherman called “a desperate and terrible thing,” as the transport ships were “floating by terrific Batteries without the power of replying.” Despite his gloomy sense of foreboding, as usual danger inspirited Sherman. He sailed out aboard a yawl into midstream and watched the federal gunboats return fire as the Mississippi’s left bank was set ablaze by Confederate shells, silhouetting the vessels against the dark backdrop. Sherman jumped aboard the Benton, offered Porter a few breezy, uplifting sentiments, “and remained to witness the scene” until they neared Warrenton. Then, on the admiral’s insistence, he leapt back aboard his yawl. In the meantime, the Henry Clay caught fire, though one of Sherman’s yawls picked up its pilot.

On the night of April 22 another half-dozen transports passed Vicksburg carrying stores and equipment to enable Grant’s troops to cross the Mississippi. These movements were not made without loss. The Tigress sank, taking with it most of the army’s medical supplies. “I look upon the whole thing,” Sherman confided to Ellen in a troubled mood, “as one of the most hazardous and desperate moves of this or any war.” He was not heartened by having to discharge from the 15th Corps a significant number of officers whose terms of enlistment had ended.43Close

The roads south were overcrowded, and on April 26 Grant asked Sherman to delay his march southward until they had cleared, or perhaps to make use of the canals on which so much fruitless labor had been lavished. Grant had gone to Carthage to supervise McClernand in response to Porter’s insistent call for another commander to be present that he could trust. Grant’s initial objective was Grand Gulf, to serve as a base for crossing the Mississippi and as a shield for his right flank as he did so; as the campaign developed, he could then anchor his rear and left on the river port as he advanced obliquely behind Vicksburg. Grant and Porter carried out a personal reconnaissance and agreed Grand Gulf could be taken quickly, but both became alarmed by the falling river levels that threatened the safety of the gunboat squadron and diminished the chances of making the most of river transport while the roads were so bad. Grant turned to Sherman for insurance and ordered him to build new roads where he could. When Sherman received these orders, they provoked another outburst of private complaints. Yet Sherman set to, conceding, “I can aid him by building a road back to Willow Bayou, so that he could exploit water transport, too.” But with a touch of self-fulfilling prophecy, he maintained that this line would be insufficient to sustain Grant’s entire army. He judged Porter’s squadron “in a fatal trap.” And with a touch of pique that his advice to return north and base operations in Memphis or Helena had been ignored, he predicted: “I say we are further from taking Vicksburg today than we were the day I was repulsed.”44Close

Grant wrote again three days later, giving Sherman more details of the intended Grand Gulf operation but saying he needed him to conduct a feint to distract Confederate attention away from it. Grant habitually used a subtle technique that ensured a measure of harmony among his troubled subordinates. All three of Grant’s corps commanders were sensitive to being ordered to carry out operations that might end in tactical failure even if they contributed to a successful outcome. If Grant suggested such a course when he felt it appropriate, he would not order it, as such an operation would have to be done without any “ill effect on the army and the country”; he did not mention officially an unpalatable fact, either (though he did in a short private letter), but Grant had invited Sherman to carry out an operation that might result in a repulse or at least “the appearance of a repulse.” He asked Sherman to mount “a simultaneous feint on the enemy or the enemy’s batteries on the Yazoo, near Haines Bluff’ as “most desirable.” Grant evidently realized that Sherman would be very sensitive on this point. An implied encouragement for Sherman to defy the press earned his immediate assent.

A display of zealous public loyalty then ensued. Sherman drew 10 small regiments from Blair’s 2nd Division and placed them on 10 transports. By 10:00 a.m. on April 29, he had sailed once more to the mouth of the Yazoo River and joined a small squadron of ironclads under Admiral Porter, supported by several wooden vessels. The following morning, they sailed within range of the batteries at Haines Bluff and then opened fire for four hours—“and they gave us back as much as we sent.” The Choctaw was hit 46 times, “but,” Sherman observed, “strange to say, no men were hurt.” During the evening Sherman ordered an ostentatious diversion and gave the impression that he was about to launch an assault. “Keeping up appearances till night, the troops were re-embarked,” Sherman reported tersely. During this successful enterprise only one man was slightly hurt. Porter praised Sherman’s moral courage for returning to “the scene of his earlier repulse.” Sherman had succeeded brilliantly in prolonging “the diversion as much as possible in your favor,” as he informed Grant. Ellen warned him that the newspapers had nevertheless reported his efforts as “another failure.”45Close

Before Sherman could repeat this repertoire the following morning, he received orders to immediately bring two of his divisions, Tuttle’s 1st and Steele’s 3rd, to Perkin’s Plantation, some 40 miles downstream. But Blair’s 2nd Division continued the demonstration until nightfall, when it boarded for Young’s Point. On May 1 Sherman accompanied Blair’s 2nd Division to Milliken’s Bend, where it remained as a garrison while Sherman set off with his other two divisions to march the 63 miles to Hard Times Plantation, about four miles above Grand Gulf. When he arrived on May 3, he found that Grand Gulf had been abandoned by the Confederates that day and had been quickly occupied by Union forces. With these two divisions of 15th Corps, Sherman then began to cross the Mississippi River during the night of May 6–7 by means of transports used as ferries and an improvised, temporary “floating bridge,” passage being completed by the evening of May 7. At long last Sherman and his men, after trials lasting six months, placed their feet firmly on terra firma. Such progress began to alter Sherman’s attitude toward the campaign; he still entertained private doubts as to whether Grant could actually take Vicksburg “but shall be agreeably surprised if we do.”46Close

Sherman noticed during the march to Hard Times that the countryside overflowed with foodstuffs. Not everything could be taken from the countryside, so “[we] must learn to live on corn and beef ourselves,” he observed to Ellen perceptively. Although he was prepared to take food from civilians, he recoiled from “this universal burning and wanton destruction of private property [which] is not justifiable in war.” In his Memoirs he mentions entering a plantation mansion that he later discovered belonged to the brother-in-law of his foster father’s friend Maryland senator Reverdy Johnson, a stout Unionist. He found in the drawing room a soldier lounging on the piano stool with his feet on the keyboard and with the contents of the library strewn about. “I started him in a hurry to overtake his command,” Sherman wrote with satisfaction. He tried his best to rescue and protect the house’s contents, but the pressure of the campaign distracted him, and the mansion eventually succumbed to arsonists. Sherman was probably right in assuming that stragglers were most to blame for such depredations rather than the fighting troops.47Close

Sherman revealed to Ellen on May 6 that “Grant is calling for me very impatiently and I will probably push out to him with my advance Guard tomorrow.” Sherman’s troops marched 18 miles to Hankinson’s Ferry, crossed the Big Black River on a pontoon bridge swiftly constructed by his engineers, and advanced on Big Sandy. On May 11 Sherman entered Auburn, Mississippi, and at last encountered Grant, who accompanied him and the 15th Corps for the next three days. Of course, Grant and Sherman had exchanged letters in the meantime. Grant had ordered Sherman to establish lines of communication with Grand Gulf and fill a wagon train with rations of hardtack and coffee, plus ammunition, and send it northeast. The Army of the Tennessee could not live off the country entirely, but to a skeptical Sherman, Grant stated firmly that he could draw necessities from Grand Gulf, “and we can make the country furnish the balance.” Such logistical constraints merely added to the urgency of achieving the campaign’s operational goals in the shortest possible time. Grant underlined “the overwhelming importance of celerity in your movements”; Sherman, ever loyal, hastened to do Grant’s bidding. So far, he had only been delayed for three hours by a cavalry skirmish at Fourteen Mile Creek, unlike McPherson’s troops, which on May 12 had defeated a small Confederate force at Raymond, 10 miles from the Mississippi state capital, Jackson. On Sherman’s arrival at Raymond, Grant personally ordered the 15th Corps to change places with the 17th Corps and occupy the right flank while McPherson’s command shifted to the center. The latter would advance on Jackson forthwith from the west on the Clinton road while Sherman’s 15th Corps advanced roughly 30 degrees to it and approached Jackson from the southwest.48Close

Sherman and McPherson conferred through the night of May 14–15 and decided to advance on Jackson simultaneously. The roads had previously been dust laden—Sherman indeed thought the dust over the previous few days “the worst”—but it rained torrentially on May 13–14, and the going became arduous and sticky. Less than 3 miles from the city’s center the Confederates occupied a position adjacent to an intact bridge. Sherman reconnoitered personally, and at the first sign of an assault, the Confederates “opened [fire] on us briskly.” Sherman ordered forward three of Tuttle’s brigades and two batteries of artillery; the latter quickly silenced the Confederate guns, whereupon the Confederate force withdrew about half a mile into a line of entrenchments. The Union infantry crossed the bridge and deployed beyond it, but the Confederate position still looked formidable. Sherman ordered Captain Julius Pitzman, an engineer on his staff, to take the 95th Ohio Infantry to the right flank to discern whether a way around existed. In the meantime, Steele’s 3rd Division came up, so when Pitzman returned and reported that the defenses were “abandoned at the point where they crossed the railroad,” Sherman ordered Steele to advance and take advantage of this weakness. As soon as Sherman heard the cheers of Steele’s men, he threw Tuttle’s division forward, and it entered Jackson by the main road. The Confederate garrison, commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, withdrew hastily to the north, but Sherman captured 250 prisoners and the entire stock of Confederate artillery (18 guns), plus much ammunition and stores. The biggest prize yet in the campaign had fallen.

Once Jackson had been neutralized, Grant’s thoughts shifted to switching the advance westward in order to defeat the Confederates outside Vicksburg’s defenses. He also aimed to prevent any junction between Johnston’s troops and Pemberton’s. Combined they could equal Grant’s strength, but divided they remained weak fragments. Grant summoned his corps commanders to a meeting at the Bowman House Hotel opposite the statehouse. He ordered McPherson and the 17th Corps to join McClernand and occupy Bolton to the west, while Sherman was given the task of occupying the former Confederate entrenchments. On May 15 Sherman received orders “to destroy effectually the railroad tracks in and about Jackson, and all the property belonging to the enemy.” Steele’s division was given the latter mission, and as Sherman noted, “The work of destruction was well accomplished.” Combined with specific demolition of Jackson’s military infrastructure by Brigadier General Joseph A. Mower’s brigade, the state capital was rendered useless to the Confederate war effort for some six months. Sherman’s report includes a detailed tally: among the resources destroyed were all foundries, arsenals, gun carriage workshops, all stables, carpentry and paint shops, and a cotton factory; the railroad track had been torn up 3 or 4 miles beyond the town but up to 10 miles on the all-important line west to Vicksburg.49Close

During the first occupation of Jackson, Sherman reaffirmed his ambivalent attitude toward general destruction. He had received appeals from a Mr. Green, the owner of a factory manufacturing cotton cloth, claiming that as his factory offered valuable employment to the poor, it should be spared the torch. Sherman was by no means immune to this appeal, but he decided that it should be burned down, though he made provisions for feeding any unemployed workers. He also received blandishments from the owner of the Bowman House that he had always been a loyal Union man (a frequently made, often deceitful claim). Having known this hotel during his travels back and forth from Louisiana before 1861, Sherman replied sardonically that he could gauge his loyalty by the condition of his sign, where “United States” had been hurriedly and inadequately painted out and “Confederate” scrawled over it. The building had not been placed on Sherman’s list for destruction, and he said as much. This building and a nearby Catholic church, however, were set on fire “by some mischievous soldiers.” Sherman condemned the “many acts of pillage … arising from the effect of some bad rum found concealed in the stores of the town.”50Close

On the morning of May 16 Sherman received a letter from Grant indicating that Confederates were advancing from Edwards Depot and that he should send a division forthwith westward to Bolton Station on the Pittsburgh–Jackson Railroad. He should follow with the other as soon as it completed the task of destruction of war materiél. These movements signaled the imminence of Grant’s victory at the Battle of Champion Hill that day, fought largely by the 13th Corps and supported by elements of the 17th Corps. By 10:00 a.m. Sherman had Steele’s division on the road, and Tuttle’s followed two hours later. Sherman paroled his prisoners of war in order to safeguard the wounded left by McPherson in Jackson’s hospital, as he was sure that Johnston would reoccupy Jackson as soon as he abandoned it. His two divisions covered the 20 miles to Bolton that day, so Sherman decided to press on to Bridgeport on the Big Black, where at noon on May 17 he rendezvoused with Blair’s 2nd Division and the pontoon train, thus completing the concentration of his corps. The following day Grant inflicted a sharp defeat on Pemberton’s troops on the Big Black; the arrival of the entire 15th Corps permitted Grant to consummate his two recent successes by giving the necessary momentum for a complete and final investment of Vicksburg. Sherman had the pontoon bridge laid speedily and on the night of May 17 ordered Blair’s and Steele’s divisions to cross. The boats lashed together were made of India rubber, and as darkness fell, the crossing troops were illuminated by fires of pitch pine. “General Grant joined me there,” Sherman recalled in his Memoirs, “and we sat on a log, looking at the passage of the troops by the light of those fires; the bridge swayed to and fro under the passing feet, and made a fine war picture.” Tuttle’s division then followed on the morning of May 18. Sherman decided that Blair’s rested division would bear the brunt of any fighting needed to finally take Vicksburg.51Close

From 9:30 to 10:00 a.m. on May 18 Blair’s division advanced to the crest of the high ground above the Yazoo and cut the Benton Road, thus “interposing a superior force between the enemy at Vicksburg and his forts on the Yazoo.” As it approached Vicksburg the Benton Road divided into two forks, and, careful to ensure that both forks were held until elements of McPherson’s 17th Corps arrived, Sherman had hastened to carry out Grant’s orders that he should advance on the right, with McPherson in the center and McClernand on the left flank. Sherman’s 15th Corps advanced in echelon with Blair’s division in the vanguard, Tuttle’s 1st Division in support, and Steele’s 3rd Division “to follow a blind road to the right till he reached the Mississippi.” Early on May 19 Tuttle seized the works at Haines Bluff that had defied Sherman several times but were at long last in his hands. Sherman then dispatched the 4th Iowa Cavalry to seize the battery and magazines, which that afternoon were handed over to one of Porter’s gunboats. Communication was thus opened with the fleet at Young’s Point and on the Yazoo; ammunition and supplies could henceforth be transported via the mouth of the Chickasaw. In the meantime, the 15th Corps pickets had closed up to Vicksburg’s defenses.

Grant and Sherman rode together ostensibly to check whether the Benton road along which hardtack, salt, and coffee would be carried was up to the task, but really to view the scene of the latter’s repulse the previous December. They could also observe the continuing panicky Confederate retreat back into Vicksburg’s works. As they looked over the Chickasaw battlefield, with its marshy and uninviting ground that had caused Sherman so much anxiety in December and for months afterward, Grant remained silent. Suddenly Sherman, in a burst of that impulsive candor that endeared him to his friends but annoyed many who were not so fortunate as to be included among them, declared the full extent of his previous doubts. “Until this moment I never thought your expedition a success; I never could see the end clearly till now,” he admitted. “But this is a campaign; this is a success if we never take the town.” At long last, Sherman had taken the full measure of his commander. Grant was too easily underrated even by the more perceptive. That remorseless, taciturn, enigmatic man never took counsel of his fears. He had got Sherman to Vicksburg after all, and Sherman, despite his quicksilver intelligence, had taken too long to understand his methods. Yet once convinced he always learned quickly.52Close

Sherman’s opinion on another matter is also significant because it contradicts the doubts expressed by some authorities as to the degree that Grant abandoned his lines of supply during the culminating phase of the Vicksburg campaign. “Up to that point,” Sherman wrote forthrightly in his report, “our men had literally lived upon the country, having left Grand Gulf [on] May 8 with three days rations in their haversacks and received little or nothing till after our arrival here on the 18th.” As the line of the Yazoo had been secured, he assured Ellen, his troops would “soon have plenty to eat.”53Close

Despite the easing of some problems, others had worsened. Sherman observed that although he could see the enemy easily, for they were only 400 yards away, this space constituted “very difficult ground, cut up by almost impracticable ravines, and [their] line of entrenchments.” Grant, keen to take advantage of Confederate demoralization, ordered a general assault all along the line at 2:00 p.m.; both he and Sherman underrated how much the morale of these poorly commanded Confederates revived once they had found shelter in Vicksburg’s defenses. Sherman brought forward Blair’s 2nd Division. He intended it to advance on Pemberton’s fortified line with two brigades (those of Charley Ewing and Giles Smith) to the right of the Benton road running to the Yazoo, and Kilby Smith’s brigade to its left. Sherman supervised the siting of his artillery carefully both right and left “to cover the point where the road enters the entrenchments.” He also placed Tuttle’s 1st Division close behind to exploit any opportunities, with Buckland’s brigade deployed parallel with Blair’s rearguard; the other two brigades were kept back under cover.

Four hours after the battle began, Blair reported that no progress had been made in piercing the Confederate defences running perpendicular to the road. The attack had started in fine order, but cohesion had been broken up by deep chasms. On the left of Sherman’s sector, the 13th Regular Infantry in Giles Smith’s brigade got up onto the Confederate works first and planted their colors on the parapet, supported by two further regiments; although other regiments rushed to support them, they failed to break into the Confederate position. “As soon as night closed in,” Sherman explained, “I ordered them back a short distance, where the shape of the ground gave them partial shelter, to bivouac for the night.” These plans indicate that Sherman anticipated a renewal of the attack.54Close

That night he quickly wrote to Ellen to assure her that both her brothers were safe. Charley had been wounded in the hand while successfully rescuing the 13th Infantry’s colors after he had taken command of the regiment. Hugh had been “also under fire and had a hard time yesterday,” but he was now safe. As for himself, “I must go again to the Front amid the shot and shells which follow me but somehow thus far have spared me.” He had witnessed a near miss the previous day while he and Grant watched the deployment of Steele’s division when a man standing next to them was felled by a random shot. Sherman did not dwell on the caprice of fate, but his casual references to such dangers provoked in Ellen “fearful apprehensions.” He was actually enjoying himself and had slept on the ground the last two nights, much to the disgust of his servant, John Hill, who showed even less enthusiasm for accompanying Sherman to the front.55Close

The speed with which Grant had ordered the attack had prevented any detailed preparation. On May 20 Grant conferred with his corps commanders. Sherman did not consider this meeting a “council of war,” more an act of consultation. They all agreed that the initial failure could be explained by the necessity in such a short time to attack the strongest part of the Confederate line where the three roads entered the city. All were confident of breaking it if weaker points were selected and the artillery could be placed in locations where the weight of shells could count for more. All were keen to exploit the assumed demoralization of Pemberton’s troops. They expressed unanimity as to the practicality and prospects of success for the renewed offensive. On May 21 Grant issued orders for an assault the following day; he did not specify the tactics to be employed, though he summarized the consensus by stressing that a speedy assault by heads of columns “with bayonets fixed” covered by heavy artillery would increase the chances for success and reduce casualties. Roads were improved, new trenches dug, supplies and ammunition stockpiled, and the artillery moved to “new and commanding positions.” The Confederates had done the same, however, though harassed by Union pickets.56Close

Sherman employed what were by now his customary techniques. He carried out a detailed personal reconnaissance of his entire front. He noted that the forts were built to command the roads, for the hills and valleys “are so abrupt and covered with fallen trees, standing trees and canebrake that we are in a measure confined to the Roads.” He drew up a plan based on careful thought even though he could hardly disregard the pressure of time. He decided to attack either side of the bastion covering the road, rather than assault it directly, and confuse the Confederates by mounting a strong feint on Steele’s front about a mile to the Union right. Artillery batteries were well placed and concealed. In addition, he had asked Porter to contribute to the bombardment even though he had only a single gunboat available, the Cincinnati. Blair’s division was better concealed at the head of the road this time, with Tuttle’s division well in hand for support. A select, volunteer storming party of 150 men would carry boards and poles to enable the ditch to be crossed. Ewing’s brigade should follow after a short interval, then Giles Smith’s and finally Kilby Smith’s. Once more Sherman had attempted to anticipate every contingency in a plan that envisaged a “connected and rapid” advance.57Close

It was the best plan under the circ*mstances. Sherman took the precaution of devising a flank march so that the men would remain under cover for as long as possible. Confederate infantry could not be seen, but Sherman knew they were lying in wait. At the hour specified by Grant, Blair’s storming party raced up the road with Ewing’s brigade close behind, and five batteries of guns opened fire on the bastion. As the storming party approached the salient of the bastion and the sally port into the line, two ranks of Confederate infantry suddenly stood up along the entire position and delivered a devastating series of volleys that decimated the attackers. The head of the column sought cover; those behind followed suit. On the left face of the bastion the troops climbed up its exterior slope and attempted to dig down into it. Giles Smith’s brigade turned down a ravine and found cover by taking this wide circuit, but it failed to circumvent the bastion. Kilby Smith deployed between his and Ewing’s brigade, but none of these formations could get into, let alone through, this position.

At 2:00 p.m. Blair informed Sherman that though his brigades could make no progress in the vicinity of the road, Giles Smith’s brigade had nonetheless linked up, thanks to his detour, with Brigadier General Thomas E. G. Ransom’s brigade of the 17th Corps “and was ready to assault.” Sherman had selected for his command post a position about 200 yards from the Confederate front, where he could see what was happening and also be close enough so that his subordinates could consult him if necessary—but not be so close that he might be tempted to interfere in their business. He ordered a further heavy bombardment to support a renewed infantry assault. Despite this precaution, the brigades of Ransom and Giles Smith endured what Sherman called a “staggering fire” before which they recoiled and fell back under cover of the hillside.58Close

Very shortly after the repulse, Grant rode up to Sherman’s command post and dismounted. Sherman immediately reported that, despite individual acts of high courage, his troops had been thrown back; Grant responded that the troops on the fronts of the other two corps had met a similar fate. Grant’s visit was indicative of the growing intimacy between the two generals, now fully reciprocated by Sherman. While they conferred, Grant received a handwritten note from McClernand claiming in melodramatic terms that he had gained “part possession” of two of the bastions on the Union left. McClernand assured Grant that one more push would be sufficient to take them. According to Sherman’s account, Grant gave these boastful claims scant credibility, but he persuaded Grant that McClernand’s message could not be ignored—perhaps sensing the danger to Grant’s position if he failed to take advantage of any opportunity suggested by McClernand. Whatever the precise wording of McClernand’s claim, this was an example of how his incorrigible self-glorification rebounded against him, even when right was on his side. Sherman offered to attack again. He ordered Tuttle to bring up Mower’s brigade and Steele to continue with his feint on the right flank of the 15th Corps. Mower’s brigade advanced “bravely and well,” with Blair’s division moving forward once more in support. Although a regiment got its colors fixed by the side of those of Blair’s initial storming party on the Confederate parapet, no significant advance was achieved. At nightfall Sherman ordered the colors taken down and the troops withdrawn. In describing these assaults to Ellen three days later, which could hardly have lessened her fears for her husband and two brothers, Sherman used even more arresting language, saying that during the attacks “the heads of columns are swept away as chaff thrown from the hand on a windy day.”

McClernand had indeed made more progress than the other two corps, but he had exaggerated its broader operational significance and potential for exploitation. In a rare understatement, Sherman observed that McClernand’s claims had been “premature.” Steele, despite the riven country over which his troops were forced to advance, had actually reached the Confederate parapet but could not carry the works, though he maintained control of the high ground around them until night fell, whereupon he retired to his own lines. Sherman’s total casualty bill was slightly above the 600 claimed in his report submitted two days later. Grant’s total casualties were 3,052.59Close

In the days following, 15th Corps skirmishers continued to operate close to the Confederate breastworks, while the infantry withdrew into the ravines to take advantage of the cover. Sherman ordered the working parties to continue to improve the roads up to the front. He argued that the remainder of the campaign should take the form of a siege by “regular approaches.” He believed that by better use of the topography he could advance his own works as close as 100 yards from the Confederate redoubt that commanded the road. Saps—trenches dug toward the enemy’s position and usually covered—were to be started on Blair and Steele’s front. “Our position,” Sherman declared, “is now high, healthy and good. We are in direct and easy communication with our supplies.” Despite their setbacks, Sherman commented on the “cheerful spirit” of his troops. Perhaps as a reward for its courage on May 22, Mower’s brigade was sent back to the left bank of the Mississippi to complete the encirclement of Vicksburg. The river port was now surrounded on all sides. But losses still mounted. Five days later the Cincinnati was sunk.60Close

Sherman selected as his headquarters a new position in the center of the corps line. “I have a nice camp and Grant is near me,” he informed Ellen. Grant had indeed placed his own headquarters on the other side of a ravine behind Sherman’s and visited regularly. “McPherson is a noble fellow but McClernand is a dirty dog,” Sherman snapped. The even more vituperative language he used in this comparison reflects the intense and widespread resentment felt at the senseless cost of lives that resulted from McClernand’s note to Grant on the afternoon of May 23. “Blair and I are on very good terms,” Sherman revealed to John, and he benefited, too, from his brother-in-law Charley Ewing’s presence, as he could keep a watchful eye on his superior’s activities. Sherman and Blair now had a common enemy in McClernand. Blair had been infuriated by the unnecessary loss sustained by his division as a result of McClernand’s intervention. Sherman might have sensed that McClernand had committed a self-inflicted wound by his actions on May 22, but it was Blair who initiated the series of moves that resulted in McClernand’s dismissal.61Close

On the evening of June 16 Sherman had just returned from inspecting new entrenchments at Snyder’s Bluff when he met a very angry Blair, who asked him whether he had seen a copy of the Memphis Evening Bulletin that had appeared three days previously. This contained a bombastic “Congratulatory Order” in McClernand’s unmistakable florid style. Sherman read it and sat down to write Grant a letter of complaint, enclosing a copy of the paper for information. Sherman complained of the self-serving flattery of the order; rather than just confining himself to reciting the efforts of the 13th Corps on May 19 and 22, McClernand went further and slighted the efforts of the other two corps in snide asides. Sherman’s letter conveyed two essential points. First, it was unusual to issue such orders after a repulse. He had not done so after Chickasaw Bluffs—though he does not refer to this example—and they were “only resorted to by weak and vain men to shift the burden of responsibility from their own to the shoulders of others.” Second, and crucially in this case, General Orders No. 151 forbade the publication of all official orders and reports. McClernand’s order “was not an order or a report” but, Sherman argued brutally, a “publication for ulterior political purposes.” He was outraged at the imputation that he and McPherson had disobeyed Grant’s orders to support the 13th Corps on the afternoon of May 22. McPherson soon became acquainted with the contents of McClernand’s “Congratulatory Order” and also wrote a letter of complaint, remarking sarcastically that McClernand had forgotten one of the essential qualities of the warrior, namely, justice to others.62Close

Grant wrote to McClernand immediately to verify whether what he had been sent was a “true copy.” McClernand was absent when the letter arrived but on returning agreed that it was “a correct copy. … I am prepared to maintain its statements,” he wrote defiantly. McClernand only regretted that his adjutant had failed to send Grant a copy two weeks before “as I thought he had.” McClernand had earlier attempted to preempt criticisms of his conduct on May 22 by condemning the “false reports” that were “finding their ways from the landings up the river”—perhaps a swipe at Sherman. McClernand had then urged Grant to issue a “conclusive” statement that would clear the air, but wisely Grant did not do so. On June 18 Grant coolly relieved McClernand of his command and ordered him to hand over his corps to Ord, who had been urged by Sherman to be available to assume a senior position. A month later when Grant reported on the controversy to the adjutant general, he branded McClernand’s order “pretentious and egotistical.” McClernand tried to make a fight of it and sought reinstatement on the grounds that he had been appointed by the president under “a definite act of Congress”; he misguidedly tried to enlist the support of Stanton and Halleck. He asked for an investigation of Grant’s military conduct since the Battle of Belmont. Stanton did not answer until August, by which time the Lincoln administration had no interest in any sort of inquiry. McClernand languished unemployed for the remainder of the war, apart from a brief period when he commanded elements of the 13th Corps in a Texas backwater before he resigned due to ill health in the spring of 1864.63Close

According to Sherman, “McClernand played himself out and there is not an officer or soldier here but rejoices he is gone away.” Sherman certainly rejoiced. Commanders do not have to be liked to succeed, and McClernand showed some soldierly skill: he was not as bad a commander as Sherman claimed. But to succeed fully, commanders must enjoy a moral appeal and earn respect. McClernand was neither stupid nor incompetent, and Sherman exaggerated his vices. Yet he exhibited a fatal flaw. As a commander he never inspired trust, even when he did well, and thus represented a disruptive influence. Sherman at least summarized this weakness well. McClernand “could not let his mind get beyond the limits of his vision and therefore all was brilliant about him and dark and suspicious beyond.”64Close

After this flurry of excitement, military events lapsed back into the intricate routine of siege warfare. Sherman had his artillery well covered by earthworks, and his saps and parallel trenches had advanced very close to the Confederate line; his sappers and miners were hard at work “undermining the chief work to our front.” Then on June 22 Sherman received a summons to Grant’s headquarters to hear of the army commander’s fears as to the import of Joseph E. Johnston’s activities east of the Big Black River. He ordered Sherman to “go and command the entire force” and prevent any crossing of this river should Johnston seek to relieve Vicksburg. Sherman decided to take two brigades of Tuttle’s division of his own corps and Brigadier General John McArthur’s division of the 17th Corps. The 9th Corps had arrived at Haines Bluff, commanded by Major General John G. Parke, and elements of it were placed under Sherman’s command, joining him at Templeton’s, about a dozen miles northeast of Vicksburg. The rest of Sherman’s force marched on Birdsong Ferry, which Sherman calculated would be Johnston’s most likely crossing point.65Close

Our retrospective knowledge of Vicksburg’s eventual fall gives these operations an overcautious and anticlimactic character, but this should not conceal the trickiness of the task that Sherman had been set. “I hear nothing of Johnston at all; no trace of him or signs of his approach,” he reported. “The numerous fords in and near us will enable the enemy to get over and our first business is to divine his real points.” His only consolation lay in the likelihood that “a small force can oppose a large force,” though such an advantage could be turned against him. He also had no choice but to be cautious so as not to jeopardize the propaganda effect of the Union glory at Vicksburg, in which he now could not share. He would wait for Johnston “on this side of the Big Black,” but he lacked reliable intelligence and had to find it quickly. “I take it for granted,” he verified, “you do not want me to attempt to follow him across that river [Big Black] unless after a defeat.” So Sherman pushed out a cavalry screen and soon discovered that Johnston had made no attempt to cross at any point. Grant reported intelligence that claimed that Confederates had made their appearance at Hankinson’s Ferry, which Sherman doubted, but he emphasized to his subordinates that they “ought to be wide awake and ready to move in that direction.”66Close

Sherman’s vital job in safeguarding the gains Grant had made over the last two months by holding the line from the Big Black to the Yazoo was another important measure of Grant’s trust in him, even though carrying it out deprived him of sharing in Grant’s moment of triumph when he entered Vicksburg on July 4. During the interval Sherman visited more Southern friends. He ate at the Klein household near Markham’s, about 90 miles northeast of Vicksburg; Mrs. Klein was related to the sister of his brother-in-law Judge T. W. Bartley. He also helped the mother of a former Louisiana State Seminary cadet visit her son after Vicksburg’s fall. Yet not finding Johnston did not solve Sherman’s problems, because the Big Black could be crossed easily at numerous points. The activities of pro-Confederate informers led Sherman to conclude that they expected Johnston’s imminent arrival. Yet by June 27 Sherman had “not a sound, syllable, or sign to indicate a purpose of crossing Big Black towards us.” Sherman felt very isolated and three days earlier had written to Grant asking him to confirm whether Port Hudson had fallen, as he had heard. On July 3 Grant warned Sherman that Vicksburg was on the verge of surrender. He ordered that when confirmation arrived, he should cross the Big Black and, as Sherman put it tersely, “drive Johnston away etc.” Sherman did not feel downcast by his absence from Vicksburg. As he assured Grant, “I did want rest, but I ask nothing until the Mississippi River is ours, and Sunday and 4th of July are nothing to Americans till the river of our greatness is free as God made it.” The revelation of such generosity of spirit must have fortified Grant’s trust in his wayward, mercurial, and invariably loyal subordinate.

July 4 celebrations, alas, did slow down Sherman’s concentration of force. He asked for the remainder of his corps and Parke’s 9th Corps, as well as Ord’s 13th Corps—in effect a small army of 34,000 men—that operated independently but still under Grant’s control and general direction. The heat and dust, as well as hangovers, delayed his usual brisk movements. The heat was so torrid that his troops marched at night and slept by day.67Close

On July 6 Sherman crossed the Big Black and advanced eastward toward Jackson once more, this time via a more northerly route. The latest intelligence revealed that he faced “four strong divisions” of Confederate infantry—those of Major General William W. Loring, Major General Samuel French, Major General William H. T. Walker, and Major General John C. Breckinridge, plus Brigadier General William H. Jackson’s division of cavalry. Sherman rated Confederate cavalry “so much better than ours, that in all quick movements,” he informed Ellen, “they have a decided advantage.” For some time Sherman was unsure of Johnston’s strength, but by July 17 he concluded that he commanded 30,000 men; this was an exaggeration, for within a week Sherman had before him the remarkably accurate estimate of 22,000. On July 9 Sherman’s force closed up on Johnston’s defensive line across the Clinton road. Sherman’s personal reconnaissance revealed that Johnston had “his whole army, and that he had anticipated [a] siege, and had prepared accordingly.” By July 14 he noted that Johnston “has manifested no intention to rally, and has permitted us to surround him with parapets”—a striking early example of Sherman’s use of entrenchments in the offensive.68Close

Sherman at once decided to hold Johnston in Jackson while his cavalry and light infantry fulfilled the second part of Grant’s instructions, namely, the destruction of the railroads that would greatly reduce the Confederacy’s ability to wage war further in this theater. In a design that he would replicate on a larger scale the following year, he would work around “one flank or the other” while threatening to cross the Pearl River and cut Johnston’s line of retreat. On the right Ord’s 13th Corps and Parke’s 9th Corps on the left extended their lines to cut the railroad north of Jackson, while Ord menaced the Pearl River crossings. The 15th Corps, currently commanded by Steele, harried the Confederate lines ceaselessly, pushing Johnston’s infantry back into their lines while the bulk of the Union infantry remained under cover. As an investment in security, as Sherman struck at Confederate communications, he asked Grant for a further division to shield his lines back to the Big Black more effectively. Sherman supervised all details very closely, as he had no wish to tarnish the shine of Grant’s great victory by any careless error. The only serious mistake occurred on July 12 when Brigadier General Jacob Lauman’s division of the 13th Corps moved beyond the cover provided by skirmishers close to the Confederate defenses covered by thick woods. It endured a battering from field artillery and musketry as it tried to move into line and suffered about 400 casualties. Sherman concluded that Lauman “either misunderstood or misinterpreted Ord’s minute instructions.” Ord relieved Lauman immediately; Sherman recognized instantly the need “to support his corps commanders in their authority” and approved this action “for the time being.”69Close

On July 14 Sherman reported that although a raid on Canton to the north east of Jackson had come to nothing, raids on Calhoun Station over 120 miles to the northeast had resulted in the destruction of two locomotives, 14 boxcars, and 20 platform cars, precious and irreplaceable assets lost to the Confederate war effort. Five bridges were also destroyed within a circumference of 15 miles from Jackson; troops entrusted with the task of railroad destruction set about it with enthusiasm at the rate of 10 miles per day. Sherman intended to open a gap in the railroad of some 100 miles. “We are absolutely stripping the country of corn, cattle, hogs, poultry, everything,” he reported “and the new-grown corn is being thrown open as pasture fields or hauled for the use of our animals.” Though Sherman conceded the awfulness of this “scourge of war,” he qualified it, effectively by abdicating responsibility for the suffering. He blamed “ambitious” Southern men who had appealed to the decision furnished by war rather than by the “learned and pure tribunals which our forefathers had provided for supposed wrongs and injuries.” The Southern people had brought their suffering on themselves. Jackson had endured a further bombardment since his last visit, amounting to 3,000 artillery rounds from 10- and 20-pounder Parrotts and 12-pounder Napoleons. Then on July 16 Johnston conducted a deftly organized withdrawal during the night, concealed to the last minute by work on his entrenchments, escaping over the Pearl River with 23,000 men and 400 wagons under cover of darkness. Sherman hastened on July 17 to occupy Jackson with Blair’s division once Johnston’s escape had been discovered. Sherman found the state capital “one mass of charred ruins” but decided not to pursue. He would be required to march across a waterless plain in the summer heat until he reached the Mobile–Ohio Railroad, “which would be more destructive of my command than fruitful in results,” so he issued an order to complete the destruction of the railroads. Thus began an enduring pattern first etched before Jackson. In total 20 platform cars and 50 boxcars and passenger cars were torched, plus 4,000 bales of cotton; numerous artillery pieces (including 32-pounder siege guns), muskets in profusion, and substantial quantities of ammunition were either destroyed or completely incapacitated.70Close

Sherman had thus cut his teeth as an army commander. He had perhaps been too slow to realize that Johnston had already planned his escape as he closed in for the kill, but his mission had been successful. His troops had attended to these additional duties with diligence and enthusiasm, which says much for his powers of leadership given that they could have been at Vicksburg and his command had been thrown together hurriedly. “We came together suddenly and have scattered as suddenly.” He asked permission to give the citizens of Jackson 200 barrels of flour and 20,000 pounds of pork to feed the populace of the town and the contiguous rural areas—so long as it was not passed on to Confederate troops. Sherman did everything in his power to “encourage the people to rebel against a Government which they now feel is unable to protect them or support them.” But the defeatist wailing Sherman had initially encountered subsided once food became available again.71Close

So Sherman advised Grant that Jackson had lost all military value and that he favored a concentration on the Big Black. The troops of his makeshift army were rested, and by July 21 the 9th and 13th Corps were back on the road to Vicksburg; by July 26 the 15th Corps and Sherman were encamped near Blair at Fox’s Creek about 20 miles from Vicksburg. All the camps were chosen because they were deemed “healthy, near good water for washing and bathing,” and Sherman could cover the bridges over the Big Black but be able to reach Vicksburg or Jackson swiftly.72Close

The following weeks would resonate in bittersweet discordance for the remainder of Sherman’s life. Things started well. On August 14 Sherman received a commission as a brigadier general in the regular army that guaranteed a future regular salary and pension, thus permanently solving the issue of his postwar livelihood. He wrote at once to his father-in-law expressing the “hope that I have made some amends for deep anxiety which I know I have caused you at times.” He had also, at long last, arrived at a just estimate of Grant’s true ability and stature as a commander. His praise of Grant became fulsome and genuinely admiring, and he described himself as an “ardent friend” who took the opportunity of warning his companion in arms against sycophancy. Sherman hoped that he would “serve near and under you, till the dawn of that Peace” for which they were both striving. He revealed to Lew Wallace that he thought one of Grant’s best attributes was the rare talent “of using various men to produce a common result.” Wallace had complained of Grant’s coldness, and Sherman offered him some excellent advice, which he had allowed himself to take in varying degrees. “Avoid all controversies, bear patiently temporary reverses, get into the current events as quickly as possible, and hold your horses for the last stretch.”73Close

At the end of July, Ellen and the four children, Minnie and Willy (with whom his father had the closest rapport) and Lizzie and Tom, agreed to visit him in camp. This was a project that both Ellen and Sherman had long contemplated and worked for; as a result, both would be tortured by guilt by its consequences. Though Sherman joked with his brother-in-law Phil that Ellen would have to get accustomed to “Hard tack and Canvas,” actually he thought the accommodation quite comfortable—“one of the most beautiful camps I ever saw.” He waited impatiently for their arrival at the end of August. Sherman overflowed with good cheer, and there were parades, sightseeing, and calls on his friends, including the Grants (as Mrs. Grant had come to visit her husband, too). His headquarters guard, the 13th Regular Infantry, adopted Willy, just 9 years old, a clever, forceful little character, as a mascot, and he was delighted to receive a uniform as an honorary sergeant. Sherman and Ellen were housed in two hospital tents and the children, amid much excitement, in “two common wall tents.” “All are well and really have improved in health down here,” he wrote proudly and prematurely to John. “It makes me old to see her [Minnie] and the others growing so fast,” as he had not seen them for over 18 months. Ellen conceived another child during these weeks.74Close

Disaster then struck. As the Shermans were about to begin their journey back to Ohio, Sherman noticed that Willy looked unwell. Although Ellen would later blame herself for taking the symptoms insufficiently seriously, she immediately put him to bed. A military surgeon diagnosed typhoid, but as the river level fell they made slow progress on their steamer as far as Helena and did not arrive at Memphis until October 2. Willy’s condition, which he bore “with unassuming patience,” deteriorated, and the doctor warned that his life was endangered. He was moved at once to the Gayoso House, where he died on the evening of October 3. Grant was one of the first to receive notification of the appalling news on October 4. That night Sherman, in shock at the loss of the son that Ellen knew he “idolized,” burst out, “God only knows why he should die thus young. He is dead, but will not be forgotten till those who knew him in life have followed him to that same mysterious end.” The loss of the boy that he would describe 12 years later as the “most precious” of his children represented a blow from which he and Ellen would never recover. Ellen had experienced a premonition “that he would not live to grow to manhood” the previous February but was inconsolable when the awful event came true. Though Sherman thanked the commanding officer of the 13th Infantry for the regiment’s kindness to his late son, he asked for no sympathy because he would busy himself with his duty—“I must go on till I meet a soldier’s fate.” But he felt a needling guilt at inviting his family to “so fatal a climate.” He resolved to “try and make Poor Willy[’]s memory the cure for all the defects which have sullied my character.”

His beloved son’s sudden death shattered any residual religious belief that he may have casually entertained, and he ignored all of Ellen’s subsequent entreaties to embrace the Catholic Church. He could not share pious Ellen’s redemptive, symbolic sense of Willy’s loss, however much it pained her, though he did join his wife in deep, prolonged and elaborate mourning rituals. Sherman never tired of memorializing Willy or inviting discussions of the enormity of the loss of one so young or the “might-have-beens” of his life. “Now that he is past all panic and sorrow his Memory must be a strange link in the chain of family love that binds us altogether.” When his new son was born in June 1864, Sherman agreed with Ellen that he should not bear his brother’s name, then a fashionable practice: “Though dead to the world he [Willy] yet lives forth in our memories.” Whether Willy, who so resembled his father, could have continued indefinitely to carry the weighty responsibility of his parents’ hopes wrapped in the “virtues of a manly nature and Christian soul,” without tension, resentment, even rebellion or rejection, can never be known. What is clear is that Willy would always remain for his father a haunting presence who would be riding by his side in the next campaign.75Close

To Sherman the triumph of Vicksburg, including all the successes notched up since Arkansas Post, represented “the first gleam of daylight in this war.” All of his biographers agree that it represents an important learning experience for this commander. But this experience must be set within the context of the disappointments of the first Vicksburg campaign. They distorted Sherman’s judgment and account for the development of his essentially cautious outlook, mainly a product of the great distances that needed to be traversed in this theater. As Sherman explained to Ellen, “The moment an army moves in this country, it draws itself out in a long thin string exposed to all manner of Risk.” Despite his characteristically gloomy prognosis that emphasizes continuing Southern resistance, especially “the deep and bitter enmity” of Southern women, he admitted that Vicksburg “looks to a conclusion.”76Close

Of course, Sherman remained anxious lest complacency set in again. In July 1863 he became alarmed by the violence and anarchy of the New York draft riots, though he was pleased by how quickly they were suppressed. He fretted that even greater efforts would be required in the future to finally slay the beast of secession. “The war is not over yet,” he warned Lew Wallace. The North needed to make a supreme effort; hence the need for energetic recruiting as the end of three-year enlistments approached. The simplistic idea that these views were an expression of Sherman’s “fury” at the South, or that, as he embraced the elements of “total war,” he desired the unleashing of expanding and indiscriminate quantities of destructive force on the South, should be set aside firmly. Such a conclusion reads too much of the future into his views. Despite the welter of distractions, during the spring he had studied General Orders No. 100, known as the Lieber Code, which clarified “military necessity,” defined as “those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war” and yet remain lawful.

True, Sherman upheld the “display of force” as a means of eroding Southern morale further. “It is more honorable to produce results by an exhibition of Power,” he concluded, “than by slaying thousands.” Certainly, he admitted that more killing would be required, but he placed an increasing emphasis on deterrent power rather than unfocused destruction for its own sake. “We must make this War so fatal and horrible that a Century will pass, before new demagogues and traitors will dare to resort to violence and war, to achieve their ends.” Sherman concluded that policy should “make this War as severe as possible … till the South begs for mercy.” But the means he sought to create such conditions were altogether more subtle, based increasingly on the demonstration of superior military force rather than on its naked and brutal application. His ideas had passed the formative stage by the summer of 1863.77Close

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